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AP'P'ELLANT''S BRIEF
STATE:\fEXT OF r:CHE KIXD OF CASE
So far as the appeal is concerned, this is an action to
recover b:- way of counterclaim the reasonable value of
building materials sold and delivered to the plaintiff by
the defendant and to foreclose a materialman's lien.
DISPOSFrJOJ\ E\ LOWER COURT
The ea~e was tried without a jur:- and judgment was
entered awarcbng the defendant the amount prayed for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in its cross-complaint. Its claim of lien was adjudged to
have been waived and released. The plaintiff's complaint which sought to recover dan1ages for slander of
title, consisting of recording of the materialman's lien,
was disn1issed. Upon motion of the plaintiff to amend
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, the plaintiff
was awarded an attorney's fee in the .mnount of $1,000.00
which was deducted from the amount awarded the defendant in the original Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks (a) reversal of those portions of
the J udg1nent and .Amend eel Judgment which cancel the
m.aterialn1an's lien and award the plaintiff an attorney's
fee, (b) a judgment in its favor foreclosing its lien, (c)
attorney's fee in the sum of $1,000.00, and (d) costs of
preparing lien and abstracting.
ST·ATEMEXT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Brimwood Homes, Inc., owns a tract
of land in Salt Lake County which it subdivided into lots
known as Jordan Yillage Xo. :2 SubdiYision (R. 1). It
obtained from Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association, hereinafter designated Prudential, a commitment to finance the construction of hmnes on the lots
(R. 152). A nwrtgage on each lot was executed to secure
each loan. Abstracts of these mortgages are contained
in Exhibit D-6. Defendant l(nudsen Builders Supply
Con1pany sold and delivered to the plaintiff Brimwood
Homes a large amount of building n1ateri.al which plain-
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tiff used in the construction of the homes. As building
progressed, plaintiff delivered to the defendant written
authorizations to Prudential to pay defendant a specified
amount on account of materials furnished to the plaintiff
by the defendant (Ex. P-7-12). The payment was to be
charged to the plaintiff with respect to its loan designated by number. On the other side of this written
authorization was a receipt and lien release to be executed by the defendant. Armed with this authorization,
defendant presented it to Prudential, executed the receipt and lien release and received the sum specified in
the .authorization (R. 120).
Inasmuch .as the case turns upon the legal effect to
be given to the receipt release, we set forth below for the
convenience of the ronrt an exact copy of one of them.
RECEIPT AND LIEN RELEASE
Salt Lake City, Utah, April 21, 1961
Received from PRFDEXTIAL FEDERAL SAYINGS
AXD LOAN ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter designated
Association), the sum of Six Hundred Ten and 60/100
Dollars ($610.60) in Full payment of labor and/or rnaPartial
terials furnished and delivered by the undersigned for
construction of building and improvements on Lot 203 of
Jordan Village No. 2. This receipt is executed and
delivered by the undersigned to the Association to induce
it to make payment to the undersigned of the above stated
sum from funds held by it for the owner of above described real property and in consideration thereof the
undersigned hereby waives, releases and discharges any
lien or right to lien the undersigned has or may hereafter
acquire against said real property.
KNUDSEN BUILDERS SUPPLY CO.
/s/ Leland A. Searle, Treas.
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Sixteen of such receipts \\'Pre executed by defendant
and delivered to Prudential (Ex. P-7-12). The only
variation in them is with rr~p<>et to the date, the amount
of money and the lot number.
The trial court found that between the 19th day of
February, 1961 .and the 27th tlay of ::\fay, 1961, the defendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff, at its special
instance and request, building rnaterials of the reasonable value of $3,911.64 after crediting all payments theretofore made; that the n1aterials were used by the plaintiff
in the construction of improvements on the lots; that the
last rnaterial was furnished on :Jiay 26, 1961; that defendant's notice of claim of lien was recorded on July
18, 1961 ; that at the time each payment "~as made by
Prudential to the defendant, there remained a balance
due from the plaintiff; and that the account was never
paid in full. It also found that n1aterials were supplied
by the defendant to the respective lots both after and
before the execution of the applieable receipt (R. 36-41).
The plaintiff, .according to the findings also made payn1ents direct to the defendant but at no tin1e was plaintiff's account paid in full. The couri concluded that by
executing the receipt releases and delivering them to
Prudential, the defendant rele.ased and discharged any
lien which it then had or which it thereafter acquired
(R. 39-40).
ARG l ':Jl EXT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT EHR1~:D IX COXCLUDING TI-IAT Dl~FEXDA:\T \VAJ"VED AND
RELEASED IT'S LJ:EN.
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1Tnder the fads found by the court below there can
lw no question hut tk1t the defendant, Knudsen Builder~
Rnppl~, Con1pany, waH entitled to and perfected a valid
materialman'~ lien upon Lots 203, 204, 206, 207, 212 and
21:1, Jordan Yillage X o. 2 Subdivision, as security for
thP balance due of $3,911.64. (Sections 38-1-3, 38-1-7,
U.C.A., 1953) Since Brinnvood !Tomes, Inc. was the
owner of all of these lots at the time the building material
was supplied, and purchased the materials directly,
Knudsen Builders Supply Company was not required to
prove the amount of material that went to each lot. See
Ctnh SaV:ings and Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah
2d 335, 366 P.2d 598, and cases therein cited. However,
the notice of claim of lien did make this allocation and
the evidence supported it.

The court's conclusion that defendant waived and
released its lien b~~ executing and delivering to Prudential the receipt release forms above set forth is contrary to well estab]jshed principles of law. It gives to
those instruments a legal force and effect which they do
not purport to havP and ·which the parties to them never
intended they should have.
It is to be noted that the plaintiff-respondent is not
a party to the receipt releases. It follows that it cannot
assert any rights under them unless it can successfully
maintain that they were entered into for its benefit. This
point was clearly stated h~, the Idaho Supreme Court in
a recent decision involving the construction of a similar
receipt release.
''Inasmuch as the Eldredges were not parties
to the agreement, the only way its terms could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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be extended to them would be to consider them
as third party beneficiaries." Dawson v. ~Eld
redge, 372 P.2d 414 at 417.
The question to be decided on this appeal, therefore,
is whether the plaintiff is a third party beneficiary of
the receipt releases.
The receipt release has three distinct aspects. It is
a receipt of a certain sum in full/partial payment of all
labor and material furnished and delivered. Next, it is a
release of any lien or right of lien the defendant then
had. Third, it waives, releases and discharges any lien
or right to lien which defendant might thereafter acquire
against the property. The second phase of the instrument is mere surplusage in any instance where the first
aspect is a receipt of full pay1nent for all material previously deliYerd, since such payrnent prevented any lien
from arising on account of such n1aterial. As shown
above, the receipt provisions are ambiguous with respect
to the nature of the payment. They are in the alternative -that is "full" or" partial"-- payment for material
delivered to the lot identified therein. X either the word
"full" nor ''partial" is stricken out on any receipt. It is
impossible, therefore, to detern1ine fron1 the instrument
whether the payment is partial or in full. This ambiguity
is resolved by the uncontroverted evidence which establishes that the receipt release evidenced only partial payment for rnaterial delivered to each of the lots in
question. Prudential's loan officer testified without objection that Prudential under the authorization for payment appearing on each receipt release was paying only
for materials in the runount shown thereon; that Pru-
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dential made such payment pursuant to its duty to do so
under its loan agreement with plaintiff and that Prudential was not paying for anything other than for materials
in the amount indicated thereon.
With respect to material sold to the plaintiff and
delivered to the lots and for which payment was not
made under one of the receipt releases executed by the
defendant, it has no lien or right to lien until payment
was demanded .and denied and until it complied with the
statute providing for 1naterialmen's liens (Section 38-1-7,
U.C.A .. 1953). Accordingly, defendant's claims of lien
for those materials and for materials sold and delivered
after the date of execution of each respective receipt
release would be claims to liens which it might acquire
at some future date.
As the defendant makes no claim of lien against any
lot for material furnished to the lot for which defendant
acknowledged payment by· the applicable release, we are
concerned in these proceedings with only the third feature of the release. Since this purports to release a lien
not in existence and which may never come into existence,
the third aspect of the rele.ase must be construed as a
promise of the defendant to release a future possible lien.
PLAI~TlFF IS NOT A THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY lT N DE R THE RECEIPT RELEASES AND CAN ASSERT
NO RIGHTS lTNDER THEM.
The natural presnn1ption is that parties enter into a
contract for the benefit of themselves. To overcome this
presumption and successfully maintain that the contr.act
was entered into for the benefit of a stranger, it must

(A)
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contain language expressing such intent and purpose.
This intention must be expressed in clear, direct and
unambiguous language.
"To recover as a third party beneficiary, one
Inust show that the contract in question was made
expressly for his benefit. ( Civ. Code § 1559;
Shutes v. Cheney (1954) 123 CaL App. 2d 256,
262, 266 P.2d 902.) \Vhile it is not necessary that
the third party be specifically nmned a~ a beneficiary . . . 'expressly' n1eans 'in an express
manner; in direct or uninistakable terms; explicity; definitely; directly' (le Ballister v. Redwood
Theatres, Inc. (1934) 1 Cal. App. :2d 447, 448, 3G
P.2d 827; Watson v. Aced (1957) 156 ·Cal. App.
2d 87, 92, 319 P.2d 83) ... as stated in Shutes v.
Cheney, supra, 'an intent to make the obligation
inure to the benefit of the third party must have
been clearly manifested by the contracting
parties.' " City, etc. San Francisco v. Western
Airlines, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216, at 225.
As pointed out in .Jlackubin
poration, 57 A.2d 318:

l:.

Ctlri'iss-Wright Cor-

". . . Even in those States which are most
liberal in extending to third-party beneficiaries
the right to sue on contracts made by others, the
Courts recognize the right as an exception to the
original rule of the cmnn1on law which arose from
the natural presumption that a contract is intended only for the benefit of those who enter
into it. Thus it is generally accepted that before
a stranger to a contract can avail himself of the
exceptional privilege of suing for a breach thereof, he must at least show that it was intended for
his direct benefit. German Alliance Insurance Co.
v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 33 S.Ct.
32, 35, 57 L.Ed. 195, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 1000; Robins
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Dr~· Dock & Hepair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 4R
S.Ct. 13-~, 7:!. L.Ed. 290. An incidental beneficiary
acquires by virtue of the promise no right against
the promisor or the promisee. 1 Restatement,
Contracts, ~ec. 147. In order to recover it is
essenti.al that the beneficiary shall be the· real
promisee~ i. e., that the promise shall be made
to hiln in fact. though not in form. It is not
enough that the contract may operate to his
benefit. It must clearly appear that the parties
intend to recognize him as the primary party in
interest and as privy to the promise. Haines v.
Pacific Bancorporation, 146 Or. 407, 30 P.2d 763;
In re Guhelman, 2 Cir., 13 F.2d 730, 48 A.L.R.
1037."

If the direct and unambiguous language of the contract discloses an intention to m.ake a gift of the promise
to the third part~·, or if it discloses an intention that the
performance of the pr0111ise shall satisfy an actual or
supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the third
party, the latter may enforce the contract. In the first
premise, the third party is designated as a donee beneficiary and in the second as a creditor beneficiary. If
such language discloses an intention merely to benefit the
third party as an incident to the performance of the promise, the third party as an incidental beneficiary cannot
maintain an action on the contract and has no rights
therein. See Oerman . Alliance Insurance Company v.
Home Water Si•pp!y Company, 222 lT.S. 220, 33 Sup. Ct.
32, 57 L.Ed. 195, 42 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1000, Restatement
Contracts, Section 133.
The foregoing propositions are expressly approved
and adopted by this court in Kelly v. Richards, 95 lTtah
563, 83 P.2d 731.
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The contract under consideration obviously contains
no language indicating any intention on the part of the
defendant or Prudential to confer any rights or benefits
upon the plaintiff either b~· way of gift of a promise or
in satisfaction of an actual or supposed or asserted duty
of Prudential to the plaintiff. On the contrary, the plain
intention of the parties to the contract and the primary
purpose of entering into it w.as to benefit themselves.
The plaintiff desired to obtain pay1nent for its materials,
Prudential desired to maintain the priority and integrity
of its mortgage and the sole purpose of the contract was
to effectuate these objects.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contr.act also make clear this purpose. The plaintiff had
negotiated loans frmn Prudential to finance the construCtion of homes on the lots. Prudential had committed
itself to n1ake the loans and had taken mortgages on the
lots. These mortgages were practically v.alueless at the
time they were executed because the lots were unimproved. To inject a substantial value into them as security, it was essential that hon1es be constructed on the
lots. To establish and 1naintain the priority of the mortgages, it was necessary that the loan funds be applied
to the payment of the 1naterial that went into the homes.
In this situation, the parties properly undertook to
protect their respective interests by entering into these
receipt release agreements.
The facts in J( el!y L Riclw rd.-.·, supra, are closely
analogous to those in the present case. Richards Barlow
::\fotor Company whose name wa~ later changed to TriState Motors applied to 'Villis Overland, Inc. for a fran-
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rhise to ~<'ll automobiles. Overland advised Tri-State
that the franehise could not he granted unless Tri-State
ohtained additional c-apital in the amount of fifty thousand dollar~. Certain stockholders of Tri-State agreed to
contribute thirty-five thousand dollars as additional
capital in order to meet the requirement of Overland.
The franchise was granted in reliance upon this .agreement. Tri-State became insolvent; a receiver was appointed, and suit was brought against the stockholders
to recover the thirty-five thousand dollars which they
had agreed to contribute to Tri-State. Overland was not
one of the creditors represented by the receiver. The
court held that the complaint which set forth the above
facts did not state a cause of action because neither the
terms of the contract nor the facts and circumstances
surrounding its execution disclosed any intention or purpose to benefit the creditors represented by the receiver.
rrhis decision, we submit, controls the present contro-

Dawson v. Eldredge .above cited is also squarely in
point. Dawson agreed to furnish the labor and material
to construct a dwelling house on the property of Eldredge. The latter negotiated a loan from Home Federal
Savings and Loan Association to finance the construction. The loan association refused to complete the loan
unless Dawson guaranteed to complete the construction
and keep the property free from any liens for material
or labor irrespective of who furnished it. Dawson completed the building .and brought suit to foreclose his lien
for labor and material which Edredge had failed to pay
for. The latter successfully contended in the lower court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that Dawson had by virtue of his agreement with the
loan association, waived his lien against the property.
By unanhnous decision the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the trial court and directed it to foreclose the
lien.
''Inasmuch as the Eldredges were not partie~
to the agreement, the only way its terms could be
extended to them would be to consider them as
'third party beneficiaries.' From the terms of
the .agreement, and the circumstances surrounding its execution, it is self-evident that it was
executed for the benefit of the association to
assure to them that Dawson would complete the
dwelling and protect the association and its mortgage lien from claims of materialmen and mechanics, and not for the benefit of the Eldredges
. . . . \¥hile the loan made by the association was
for the benefit of the Eldredges, they receiving
the proceeds thereof, the prmnise by Dawson to
the association to cmnplete the dwelling free of
all liens was solely for the benefit of the association, to assure the improvements on the property
would be made, thereby providing security for
the loan. The court erred in its determination
that Dawson waived his rights to claim of lien,
as against the Eldredges.
(B)

THERE \YAS NO CONSIDERATIOX
FOR THE PROMISE TO RELEASE
FUTURE LIENS

\Y e do not contend that the third party beneficiary
must furnish consideration for the promise as a condition
to enforcing it. What we do maintain is that the promise
must be supported by a consideration furnished either
hy the prmnisee or the third party beneficiary. In the
present case, neither Prudential nor Brimwood furnished
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an~·

considPration for the promise of the defendant to
release the future liens. If the release had been given in
compromise of a disputed clai1n, there might be a basis
for finding a consideration for the promise. But no such
dispute existed and the undisputed testimony is that
Prudential intended the release as a discharge of the
lien onl~~ to the extent of the amount paid to defendant
(R. 146-151). Furthermore, Prudential did not treat the
execution of the initial receipt release by the defendant
on each lot as sufficient to rele.ase the lot from any claim
of lien b~· defendant for material which was not paid for.
Instead, it required the defendant to execute a release
affecting the smne lot every time Prudential made a disbursen1ent pursuant to the authorization for payment. In
this posture of the case, the promise to release liens
that may or may not arise cannot be enforced, bec.ause it
is without consideration from any source. Neither the
plaintiff nor Prudential give up anything for such a
promise and will suffer no detriment by reason of it.
This point arose in the c.ase of Ha.ines v. Pacific
Bancorporation, 30 P.2d 763. The plaintiff Haines owned
200 shares of stock in the Portland National Bank. In
order to obtain control of the bank, the defendant entered into an .agreement with the remaining stockholders,
to purchase their stock for $150 per share. In the same
contract, the defendant agreed to purchase the plaintiff's
:-;tock for $300 per share. The plaintiff brought suit on
this contract to recover $60,000 for his 200 shares of
stock. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the plaintiff was an incidental beneficiary of the contract, and
could not maintain any action upon it. It also pointed
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out that plaintiff could not enforce the promise, bec.ause
there was no consideration for it. We quote from the
opinion at page 764:
"It is clear from these allegations of thP
cornplaint that the consideration for the promise
relied upon by the plaintiff was the transfer to
the defendant of stock by persons other than
plaintiff for which the stipulated price has been
paid. The contract, therefore, was not made for
the sole benefit of the plaintiff, nor was the primary purpose of the contract to benefit the plaintiff. He w.as not a. party to the contract. He
furnished no part of the consideration, and whatever benefit he was to receive was merely incidental to the terms of a sale of property in which
he had no interest.... "

(C) EQUITY FORBIDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE RECEIPT RELEASE
ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFF.
To allow the plaintiff to use the receipt release to
deprive the defendant of .a valid and subsisting lien upon
the property would amount to the condonation of a fraud
upon the defendant even though the language of the instrument Inay be sufficient to accomplish that effect. In
Esser v. Community, etc. School District No. 62, 81 N.E.
2d 270, 335 Ill. App. 199, the plaintiff had agreed to
construct .a school building for the defendant. In the
course of construction of the building, the bank in which
the school district's funds were deposited failed and defendant was unable to pay the plaintiff for the labor and
material furnished. The district applied to a federal
agency for funds to complete the building. The agency
required that the plaintiff release its claim against the
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district in order to give priority to the government loan.
The plaintiff released his claim and the government consummated the loan. The district then refused to pay the
plaintiff asserting that he had released his claim. The
court held otherwise. The following quotation is particularly applicable to the present case.
''. . . There is also another rule of construction which applies in the present case. If A receives a contract or other instrument from B,
knowing that it w.as designed by B to bear a
particular interpretation and to be used only for
a specific purpose, then A has no right to give it
a different interpretation, or to use it for a different purpose, though such new purpose may be
consistent with the language of the instrument.
To permit A to pervert the instrwment from the
purpose for which he knew it was intended by B,
wou-ld be to permit him to commit a fraud. This
rule is founded upon the plmiJnest dictates of
natural justice. (Italics ours.) The above rule is
the established law of this State and has been
followed in numerous cases. It is particularly
applicable to the release in the instant case. Defendant District is governed by the same standard
of honesty as a private corporation or a private
citizen and the law will not countenance any evasion by it of its just debt."
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF AND THE CROSS-D,EFENDANTS
CANNOT BE REVIEWED BECAUSE NO
APPEAL HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM IT.
On December 6, 1962, the plaintiff and cross-defendants :filed in the district court a pleading designated
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•• State1nent of Points and Notice of Cross-Appeal" in
which they give notice that they "hereby cross-appeal to
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah." Then follows
a "Statement of Point~ on behalf of the plaintiff" asserting that the court erred in finding a total debt due of
$3,911.64 plus interest on the ground that: 1. the evidence
does not support such finding and conclusion; 2. that it
is not within the pretrial order; 3. that the finding was
based on an open ''amount" which w:as not pleaded and
was a surprise and a prejudice to the plaintiff; 4. that
plaintiff should have been granted relief because of the
failure of defendant to release its lien, or in the alternative that the issue be dismissed without prejudice. The
document then recites that the cross-defendants join in
and rely on point 4 of the statement of errors.
Appellant contends that the foregoing notice and
statement is a nullity and presents nothing for review.
The defendant .appealed from specific portions of the
judgment entered in the lower court. The judgment was
partly in favor of the defendant and partly in favor of
the plaintiff. The parts which were in favor of the
plaintiff \Yere those which adjudged the lien claimed by
the defendant to be in~alid and unenforceable and
awarded the plaintiff $1,000 as attorney's fee to be deducted fron1 the amount due to the defendant from the
plaintiff. No appeal from the portion of the judgment
di:-;missing the plaintiff's cmnplaint nor that awarding
the defendant the stun of $3,911.64 plus interest has been
taken by either the plaintiff, the defendant or any crossdefendant. The time to appeal from that portion of the
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judgmPnt <'Xl)ired several d.ays before the plaintiff filed
the so-called cross-appeal.
The notice given by the plaintiff and cross-defendants makes no reference to any judgment or portion of
judgment whatever. It states only that plaintiff and
eross-defendants cross-.appeal. What they cross-appeal
from is simply a blind spot. The most that could be
reaonably read into this notice is that the parties crossappeal from the judgment appealed from by the defendant. No other meaning of the words "Cross-Appeal"
standing alone seems permissable.
Since the statement of points is directed to a portion
of the judgment not appealed from, it must under repeated decisions of this court be disregarded. Rosentlzyne v. illathe1rs, 51 Utah 38, 168 Pac. 957; l 7 tah Association of Credit J}[ en v. Board of Education, 54 Uta:h
135, 179 Pac. 975; Hartford Accident, etc. v. Clegg, 103
Ftah 414, 135 P.2d 919.
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for joint or several appeals and also cross-appeals.
Paragraph (a) states that parties interested jointly,
severally, or otherwise in a judgment may join in an
appeal therefrom, or any one or more may appeal separatel:T, or two or more may join in an appeal. When any
one or nwre parties have filed a notice of .appeal as required by- Rule 73, other parties may, under Paragraph
(b) of Rule 74, "cross appeal from the order or judgment
of the lower court without filing a notice of appeal." If
a cross-appe.al is taken, the party shall within ten (10)
days file a state1nent of points on which he intends to
rely on such cross-appeal.
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Paragraph (b) of Rule 74 is an anomaly. There is
no cmnparable provision in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or in any statute previously enacted. Adn1ittedly. it is arnbiguous and confusing. 'Ve submit that
the cro~~:-;-appeal provided for in paragraph (b) is a
cross-appe.al from the same judgment that appellant has
appealed from, and that compliance with it does not
bring up for review any judgment or part of a judgment
not identified in the apellant's notice of appeal. The
purpose of paragraph (b) is to allow the cross-appellant
to present additional grounds for affirming the judgment appealed from in cases where appellant has made
a stateu1ent of points relied on and h.as brought to this
court only parts of the record in the lower court.
There is no room in the present case for the procedure outlined in paragraph (b) because the appellant has
brought up the entire record and has not specified other
than in this brief the points on which it intends to rely.
?\ o other effect c.an be given to this paragraph without
nullifying virtually the entire procedure outlined in Rule
74.
The respondents may, "rithout resorting at all to
Rule 74 (b), invoke the consideration by this court of any
ground or reasons that are- open under any part of the
record. It may do this in its brief. It may not, however,
make Rule 74(b) perform the functions of Rule 73.
Regardless of the interpretation that may be placed
upon paragraph b of Rule 74, the points relied upon by
the cross-appellants are without merit. The contention
that the evidence does not support a finding that Brimwood IIomes, Inc. is indebted to Knudsen Builders Sup-
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ply Company in the sum of $3,911.64 plus interest is
without any foundation whatever. The finding is not
only in accordance with the uncontradicted evidence but
the fact was in effect admitted by the officers of Brimwood Homes, Inc. and also by its counsel in open court.
The further point made that the finding is based on an
issue not ·within the pretrial order and was a surprise to
the plaintiff which, if correct, would simply point up the
fact that there was no genuine dispute between the parties
as to the amount due to the defendant. The issue is,
however, presented in paragraph 1 of the pretrial order
(R. 31).

Any assertion that the finding is based on an open
account not pleaded is contrary to the record (see Paragraph 1 of the Counterclaim and cross-claim (R. 9).
rrhe claim that plaintiff should have been granted
relief under its complaint falls by the wayside, if as we
contend on this appeal, the defendant did not waive or
release its n1aterialmen's lien. We do not concede that
the plaintiff would be entitled to any relief under its
complaint even if the defendant did release its lateracquired lien but we need not discuss this point since it
is clear that the receipt release had no such effect.

SUM~fARY

Brimwood Homes Inc. was not a party to any of the
receipt releases, and cannot successfully claim any rights
or interests thereunder. None of the instruments contain
any provision or language manifesting any intention of
the formal parties to confer any direct benefits upon the
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plaintiff. On the contrary, the release is clear to the
effect that its provisions were intended to benefit the
parties to it. The primary purpose of the release was to
enable the defendant to get its money, and Prudential
to preserve and maintain the priority of its mortgage
liens. There is no consideration for any promise to
release future liens and elementary principles of fair
dealing prevent the plaintiff from using the receipt release for that purpose. The conclusion of the trial court
that the receipt release operated to free the defendant's
property from all future liens of the defendant is a perversion of this intent and purpose, and is without any
support in reason or in law.
The plaintiff has not appealed from the portions of
the judgment in favor of the defendant, and this court
cannot, therefore, review those portions. Respondents'
cross-appeal and statement of points must be regarded
as additional grounds relied upon by them for affirming
the judgment appealed from. They are superfluous since
such additional points may be presented in the respondent's brief.
The portions of the judgment appealed from by appellant should be reversed and the trial court should be
directed to grant the defendant a decree foreclosing its
lien and awarding it an attorney's fee in the amount of
$1000.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
Grant H. Bagley
H. T. Benson for Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall, & ~fcCarthy
Attorneys for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

